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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kerry Stephen Thomas appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily
dismissing his amended petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Mr. Thomas
contends the district court erred by dismissing his petition because an evidentiary
hearing was necessary to resolve the genuine issues of material fact on one of
Mr. Thomas’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Mr. Thomas
asserted his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an affirmative defense
prior to advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. Trial counsel also misled Mr. Thomas to
believe he conducted an investigation and, based on that purported investigation, the
defense was not an option. But for his counsel’s deficient performance, Mr. Thomas
would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. The district court should
have allowed an evidentiary hearing to address the genuine issues of material fact
raised in this claim.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In March of 2009, in Ada County CR 2009-4448, Mr. Thomas was indicted on
seven counts of transfer of body fluid which may contain the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (“HIV”), a felony, in violation of I.C. § 39-608. (R., p.354.) He was also charged as
a persistent violator pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., p.354.) Idaho Code section 39-608
states in relevant part:
Any person who exposes another in any manner with the intent to infect
or, knowing that he or she is or has been afflicted with acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or
other manifestations of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection,
transfers or attempts to transfer any of his or her body fluid, body tissue or

1

organs to another person is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a period not to exceed fifteen (15)
years, by fine not in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both
such imprisonment and fine.
I.C. § 39-608(1). The seven counts of I.C. § 39-608 arose out of Mr. Thomas’s romantic
relationship with the alleged victim over two or three months in late 2008, early 2009.
(Aug. R.,1 pp.2–3.) Mr. Thomas is HIV positive. (Aug. R., pp.2–3.)
In June of 2009, Mr. Thomas entered a guilty plea to two of the seven counts,
and the remaining five counts and the persistent violator enhancement were dismissed.
(R., p.354.) In September of 2009, the district court sentenced Mr. Thomas to fifteen
years, with ten years fixed, for each count, to be served consecutively, for a total
sentence of thirty years, with twenty years fixed. (R., pp.354–55.) The district court also
ordered the sentences to be served consecutive to any sentence imposed for
Mr. Thomas’s violation of his probation (also for a prior conviction of I.C. § 39-608).
(R., pp.73, 355.)
After sentencing, Mr. Thomas moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.9.)
State v. Thomas, No. 36947, 2011 WL 11047272, at *1 (Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2011). The
district court denied his motion. (R., p.9.) Thomas, 2011 WL 11047272, at *1. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order denying his motion and
remanded the case for further proceedings on whether Mr. Thomas was advised his
sentence could be served consecutive to the sentence for the probation violation.
Thomas, 2011 WL 11047272, at *4. On remand, the district court again denied

Page 3 of the Amended Petition is missing from the clerk’s record.
Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Thomas filed a motion to augment the record to
add a complete version of his Amended Petition.
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Mr. Thomas’s motion to withdraw his plea, but entered an amended judgment of
conviction ordering his sentence to be served concurrent with the sentence for the
probation violation. (R., pp.9, 47. 73.) Mr. Thomas appealed, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. State v. Thomas, No. 39374, 154 Idaho 305 (2013). (R., pp.47, 73.) A
remittitur was issued March 29, 2013. (R., pp.47, 73.)
On March 10, 2014, Mr. Thomas filed a timely pro se Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief. (R., pp.8–24.) Mr. Thomas raised three claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel: (1) failure to investigate the affirmative defense of consent; (2)
improper advisement of the mens rea element of I.C § 39-608; and (3) failure to
investigate the affirmative defense of medical advice. (R., pp.12–23.) Relevant for
claims (1) and (3), I.C. § 39-608 includes two affirmative defenses:
(3) Defenses:
(a) Consent. It is an affirmative defense that the sexual activity
took place between consenting adults after full disclosure by the accused
of the risk of such activity.
(b) Medical advice. It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of
body fluid, body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed
physician that the accused was noninfectious.
I.C. § 39-608. Mr. Thomas also moved for the appointment of counsel and for the
district court to take judicial notice of the record, transcripts, and presentence materials
in the underlying criminal case, CR 2009-4448. (R., pp.35–36, 39–40.)
On March 11, 2014, the district court granted Mr. Thomas’s motion to appoint
counsel, but only with respect to claim (1). (R., pp.46–51.) The district court notified
Mr. Thomas of its intent to dismiss claims (2) and (3) in twenty days unless its concerns
with those two claims were addressed in a responsive brief. (R., pp.46–51.) The district
court provided that appointed counsel could, but was not required, to assist Mr. Thomas
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in addressing its concerns. (R., p.51.) On March 31, 2014, Mr. Thomas, through
counsel, responded to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss and moved for the
appointment of counsel on all three claims. (R., pp.67–70.) On April 3, 2014, the district
court dismissed claims (2) and (3) with prejudice. (R., pp.72–78.)
On September 25, 2014, the State moved for summary dismissal of claim (1).
(R., pp.84–86, 88–93.) The district court then took judicial notice of the record,
transcripts, and presentence materials in the underlying criminal case, CR 2009-4448.
(R., p.120.) On December 12, 2014, the district court held a hearing and denied the
State’s motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.125, 128–34; see generally Tr. Vol. I.2)
The district court set an evidentiary hearing for March 9, 2015. (R., pp.125, 134.)
The evidentiary hearing was vacated and reset multiple times. (R., p.290.) On
July 2, 2015, Mr. Thomas moved to vacate the evidentiary hearing and requested
additional time to file an amended petition, possibly with new claims for relief.
(R., pp.143–45.) The district court held a hearing on July 14, 2015. (See generally
Tr. Vol. II.) The district court vacated the evidentiary hearing, gave Mr. Thomas 90 days
to file a motion for leave to file an amended petition, and reset the evidentiary hearing
for October 16, 2015. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, L.22–p.21, L.9.)
On September 11, 2015, Mr. Thomas moved to amend his petition. (R., p.179.)
The district court granted his motion. (R., pp.289–94.) Mr. Thomas raised two claims of

There are three transcripts in the record on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I,
contains the hearing on the State’s first motion for summary dismissal, held on
December 12, 2014. The second, cited as Volume II, contains a hearing on
Mr. Thomas’s motion to vacate the evidentiary hearing, held on July 14, 2015. The third,
cited as Volume III, contains the hearing on the State’s second motion for summary
dismissal, held on February 26, 2016.
2
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ineffective assistance of counsel in his Amended Petition.3 First, similar to claim (1),
Mr. Thomas asserted his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the affirmative
defense of consent. (R., pp.297–98.) Second, Mr. Thomas claimed his counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate the affirmative defense of medical advice.
(R., pp.298–301.) Specifically, Mr. Thomas asserted that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to contact his treating physician, James C. Roscoe, M.D., to investigate whether
Mr. Thomas was advised by Dr. Roscoe that he was noninfectious. (R., pp.298–301.)
The district court found that this new second claim was similar but not identical to claims
(2) and (3) in the original Verified Petition. The district court reasoned:
[T]he second claim is similar to the second and third claims in the original
Petition, in that Petitioner is challenging the interpretation of a statute and
the failure to interview Dr. Roscoe; however, in the Amended Petition,
Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective for [not] exploring the
defense of medical advice under Idaho Code § 39-608(3)(b) in that
Petitioner did not believe he would likely transmit HIV based on
conversations with Dr. Roscoe (whereas in the original Petition, Petitioner
alleged defense counsel did not properly understand the mental state
required for conviction under Idaho Code § 39-608(1)).
(R., p.293.) Therefore, the district court found the Amended Petition did “not improperly
seek to reintroduce claims that were previously dismissed with prejudice.” (R., p.293.)
The district court also found: “The State is not prejudiced by allowing the Amended
Petition, nor does the Court find there are any dilatory or bad faith motives on the part of
the Petitioner in seeking the amendment.” (R., p.293.) “In the interests of justice and out
of an abundance of caution,” the district court allowed Mr. Thomas “to proceed with his
Amended Petition.” (R., pp.293–94.)

Mr. Thomas’s Amended Petition incorporated by reference “all arguments and
affidavits previously, contemporaneously, and subsequently made in support of the
original Petition and this Amended Petition for post-conviction relief.” (Aug. R., p.1.)
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The State moved for summary disposition of the Amended Petition. (R., pp.303–
04, 305–23.) Mr. Thomas opposed the motion. (R., pp.326–39.) The district court held a
hearing on the State’s motion on February 26, 2016. (See generally Tr. Vol. III.) On
March 7, 2016, the district court issued an order granting the State’s motion.
(R., pp.354–67.) With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to
investigate the medical advice defense, the district court ruled:
In this case, the term “noninfectious” is neither vague on its face nor as
applied in this case.4 The most reasonable interpretation is literally not
infectious. If [trial counsel] filed a motion regarding this issue in the
underlying matter, it would have been denied. Thus, there are no genuine
issues of material fact and neither prong of Strickland5 is violated.
(R., p.367.) The district court issued a Judgment dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Amended
Petition with prejudice. (R., p.369.) Mr. Thomas timely appealed. (R., pp.375–78.)

Mr. Thomas also argued the term “noninfectious” as used in I.C. § 39-608(3)(b) was
unconstitutionally vague. (R., p.299.) He does not pursue this argument on appeal.
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Amended Petition for
post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Amended Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Mr. Thomas raises one error on appeal. He asserts the district court erred by

summarily dismissing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
investigate the affirmative defense of medical advice. The district court erred because
an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the genuine issues of material fact
regarding trial counsel’s deficient performance in failing to contact Dr. Roscoe and the
prejudice to Mr. Thomas due to counsel’s advice to plead guilty without any
investigation of this defense.
B.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence & Standard Of Review
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho

345, 361 (2013).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief
must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which
the application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134
Idaho 24 (2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however,
an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than “a short
and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a complaint under
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records,
or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such
supporting evidence is not included. Id.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST.
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amend. VI. “[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the petitioner must generally show that (1) his attorney’s performance did not
meet “an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) his attorney’s deficient
performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687–88. “Although Strickland concerned an
allegation of ineffective assistance in a sentencing proceeding, the same standard
applies equally to claims arising from the plea process.” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho
847, 850 (2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)).
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction
relief if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). “In considering summary dismissal
of an application for post-conviction relief, the trial court must accept as true verified
allegations of fact in the application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible
they may appear, unless they have been disproved by other evidence in the record.”
Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909 (Ct. App. 1995). The district court is “required to
accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the
petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Any disputed facts are
construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148
Idaho 44, 45 (2009). A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel will “survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner
establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was
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deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced
petitioner’s case.” Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 (2000). If a genuine issue of
material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the
factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application
without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and
admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Because the evaluation of a motion for summary
disposition does not involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it
necessarily involves only determinations of law. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews
a district court’s summary dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,
402–03 (2006).
C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Thomas’s Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Investigate The Affirmative
Defense Of Medical Advice
Mr. Thomas asserts he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of

counsel due to his counsel’s failure to investigate an affirmative defense in I.C. § 39608. The statute provides: “It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of body fluid,
body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed physician that the accused
was noninfectious.” I.C. § 39-608(3)(b). In his petitions and accompanying affidavits,
Mr. Thomas claimed his counsel was deficient because his counsel never contacted
Dr. Roscoe—even though Mr. Thomas told his counsel that he believed, based on
Dr. Roscoe’s advice, he was noninfectious. (R., p.26; Aug. R., pp.5–7.) Moreover,
Mr. Thomas’s counsel acted unreasonably by misrepresenting to Mr. Thomas that he
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contacted Dr. Roscoe and the defense was not an option. (R., pp.15, 26.) This deficient
performance prejudiced Mr. Thomas because, had Mr. Thomas known his counsel
never investigated the affirmative defense and failed to contact Dr. Roscoe, Mr. Thomas
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. (R., pp.20, 29, 111,
300.)
1.

Mr. Thomas’s Counsel Performed Deficiently By Failing To Contact
Dr. Roscoe And Then Mispresenting His Investigation To Mr. Thomas

Mr. Thomas submits he established a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his counsel’s performance was deficient by failing to contact Dr. Roscoe to
investigate a potential affirmative defense and then misleading Mr. Thomas about his
investigation. An evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the factual issues, and
therefore the district court erred by summarily dismissing this claim.
“Deficient performance by an attorney is performance that falls ‘outside the wide
range of professional norms.’” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004) (quoting
State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306 (1999)). “Counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.” Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 412 (Ct. App.
2013). “The duty to investigate requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable
investigation.” Id. at 412–13. “In assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s
investigation,” the Court considers “not only the quantum of evidence known to counsel,
but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate
further.” Id. Trial counsel’s tactical decisions cannot justify relief “unless the decision is
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or
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other shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561
(2008).
Here, based on the evidence presented by Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas’s counsel
did not conduct a reasonable investigation prior to advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty.
Mr. Thomas’s affidavit and original verified petition state that he asked his attorney to
contact Dr. Roscoe. (R., pp.15, 26.) Dr. Roscoe is a certified HIV specialist and treated
Mr. Thomas during the time of the alleged offenses. (R., pp.15, 31–32, 181–82.)
Mr. Thomas also stated that he informed his attorney, “I had an undetectable viral load;
and furthermore, that persons’ with an undetectable viral load are sexually noninfectious.” (R., p.26.) According to Mr. Thomas’s verified petition and affidavit, trial
counsel agreed to contact Dr. Roscoe. (R., pp.15, 20, 26.) Yet, despite his assurances,
trial counsel never contacted Dr. Roscoe prior to advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty.
Indeed, Dr. Roscoe’s affidavit states that he “was never contacted” by Mr. Thomas’s
attorney. (R., p.33.) Dr. Roscoe’s affidavits also provide that he never spoke directly
with anyone from the Ada County Public Defender’s office before sentencing.
(R., pp.33, 182.) Trial counsel, however, told Mr. Thomas that he did contact
Dr. Roscoe prior to Mr. Thomas’s entry of a guilty plea. (R., pp.15, 20, 21, 26, 27.) Trial
counsel told Mr. Thomas that Dr. Roscoe “did not share” his “understanding of HIV” and
would not confirm that his viral load was undetectable. (R., pp.15, 26). In sum,
Mr. Thomas’s petitions and accompanying evidence show trial counsel failed to
investigate a potential defense to the charges, misled Mr. Thomas about his
investigation, and advised Mr. Thomas the defense was not viable. This was deficient
performance.
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Moreover, the information that trial counsel would have received from Dr. Roscoe
would have supported the defense or, at the very least, warranted further investigation.
Dr. Roscoe stated in his affidavits that, if he had been contacted by Mr. Thomas’s
counsel, he would have provided the following information: (1) Mr. Thomas was taking
highly active antiretroviral therapy (“HAART”) to suppress HIV viral replication; (2) Due
to HAART, Mr. Thomas’s viral load was “undetectable” at the time of the alleged
offenses; (3) Mr. Thomas was informed by Dr. Roscoe that his viral load was
undetectable; (4) Effective antiretroviral therapy renders a person on such therapy
“extraordinarily unlikely, if not impossible, to transmit HIV to another person by any
means, including unprotected sexual activity”; (4) HIV medical professionals can
counsel their patients with undetectable viral loads that “transmission of their HIV
infection, by any mode, is extremely unlikely”;6 and (6) “Based on my conversations with
Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas was lead [sic] to believe that he had an extremely low risk
(less than 1%) of infecting a partner with HIV through normal sexual activity.”
(R., pp.32–33, 182.) This information would have been essential to evaluating the
defense of whether Mr. Thomas was advised by Dr. Roscoe that he was noninfectious.
I.C. § 39-608(c). But, because trial counsel never contacted Dr. Roscoe, trial counsel
did not have this information while advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty. Considering the
evidence presented and any reasonable inferences, trial counsel was deficient for failing
to investigate a potential defense to the charges, yet informing Mr. Thomas the defense
was not viable.

Dr. Roscoe added a caveat that, “Though I would never advise HIV positive clients to
have unprotected sex, including Kerry Thomas.” (R., p.33.)

6
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The district court’s ruling on deficient performance indicates that it found
Mr. Thomas failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to his “noninfectious”
status. The district court ruled, “[T]he most reasonable interpretation is literally not
infectious” and therefore, if trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges based in
the medical advice defense, the motion “would have been denied.” (R., p.367.)
However, whether Mr. Thomas was actually noninfectious is irrelevant to the defense.
What matters is whether Mr. Thomas was advised by Dr. Roscoe that he was
noninfectious. I.C. § 39-608(3)(b). Mr. Thomas’s, not Dr. Roscoe’s, understanding of his
HIV status is the primary consideration. Based on Mr. Thomas’s and Dr. Roscoe’s
affidavits, Mr. Thomas presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Dr. Roscoe advised Mr. Thomas he was noninfectious. Mr. Thomas’s counsel was
deficient by failing to investigate this defense despite the fact that Mr. Thomas told his
counsel that he believed he was noninfectious.
Finally, this claim is not disproved by the record, as argued by the State in district
court. The State noted that trial counsel stated at sentencing:
The literature also talks in great detail -- and Dr. Beaver provided me with
a number of studies, as well as his doctor who treats him at the clinic,
Dr. Roscoe. There is a great thriving debate right now in the HIV
community in regard to people who have virtually undetectable levels of
viral load. And Dr. Roscoe, his doctor, told me that Kerry’s viral load is
virtually undetectable. And to a certain extent that’s not relevant. I
understand that. The statute says you have HIV, you have intimate
contact, you have to notify. It doesn’t require that you have an elevated
viral load -- understood. But it does, in fact, go into the mindset of
someone who has HIV and is told by their doctor that they’re essentially
not capable of infecting other people.
(R., p.323; see also R., p.235 (State’s Ex. 6, Sent. Tr., p.99, L.24–p.100, L.13).) But this
excerpt of the sentencing hearing does not disprove Mr. Thomas’s claim: that his
counsel failed to investigate the medical advice defense prior to advising Mr. Thomas to
14

plead guilty. Trial counsel’s statements at sentencing indicate only that trial counsel was
told at some point by Dr. Roscoe that Mr. Thomas’s viral load was “virtually
undetectable.” It does not affirmatively show that trial counsel spoke with Dr. Roscoe
before Mr. Thomas pled guilty. In fact, Dr. Roscoe’s affidavits indicate that he may have
communicated with someone on the defense team at or around the time of sentencing.
Dr. Roscoe explained that he was present at sentencing to testify as to Mr. Thomas’s
medical condition, but he was not called upon to address the district court. (R., pp.33,
182.) This scenario is supported by the record. Immediately after trial counsel’s
statements regarding Dr. Beaver and Dr. Roscoe, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense Counsel]: Dr. Roscoe told me -[Prosecutor]: Objection.
[Defense Counsel]: -- that there are -[Prosecutor]: Objection. There’s nothing in the record to support that
argument -- nothing.
The Court: I’ll sustain the objection. There’s no expert testimony here that
makes any statement to that effect.
(R., p.235 (State’s Ex. 6, Sent. Tr., p.100, Ls.14–21.) Thus, the record supports
Dr. Roscoe’s affidavit indicating he was present at the sentencing hearing (but did not
testify) and may have communicated with someone on the defense team around that
time. At best, the State’s argument proves there are genuine issues of material fact as
to when Dr. Roscoe was contacted by the defense team, who contacted him, and what
information he provided. Dr. Roscoe’s affidavit makes clear, however, that he “was
never contacted by any member of Mr. Thomas’s criminal defense team before
Mr. Thomas was sentenced.” (R., pp.33, 182 (emphasis added).) This is the critical
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time: prior to sentencing when trial counsel was advising Mr. Thomas to plead guilty.
And, based on the evidence presented by Mr. Thomas and all reasonable inferences
therein, Mr. Thomas established a prima facie case of deficient performance for his
counsel’s failure to contact Dr. Roscoe to investigate a viable defense prior to the entry
of his guilty plea.
2.

Mr. Thomas Was Prejudiced By His Counsel’s Deficient Performance

In addition to deficient performance, Mr. Thomas submits he established genuine
issues of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him
by affecting the outcome of the plea process. An evidentiary hearing was necessary to
resolve the factual issues, and therefore the district court erred by summarily dismissing
this claim.
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if
there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “When applying the prejudice prong to a case
involving ineffective assistance of counsel in agreeing to a plea, the petitioner must
show that counsel’s deficient performance ‘affected the outcome of the plea process.’”
McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 851 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138
Idaho 76, 82 (2002)). Put another way, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement,
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 851 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
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Here, Mr. Thomas established that he would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial but for his trial counsel’s deficient performance. In his Amended
Petition, Mr. Thomas claimed: “Had an appropriate investigation been performed, the
Petitioner would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.”
(R., p.300.) Similarly, in his original Verified Petition, Mr. Thomas stated:
As the case progressed counsel began to advise Petitioner to
change his plea to guilty. Counsel misled Petitioner into believing
Dr. Roscoe had refused to corroborate Petitioner’s account of his
condition, stating: “I talked with the doctor” . . . “he doesn’t share your
understanding of HIV.”. . . Petitioner believed [his attorney]. Gradually
those interactions had a profound affect upon Petitioner resulting in
Thomas’s inability to resist his lawyer’s assertive advice.
(R., p.20.) Mr. Thomas’s Verified Petition also shows that he did not find out his attorney
“personally never spoke with Dr. Roscoe” until June 11, 2013, well after he pled guilty.
(R., p.21.) Moreover, Mr. Thomas’s affidavit confirms that he entered the guilty plea
“with the understanding” that his attorney “had fully investigated the affirmative
defenses” in I.C. § 39-608(3). (R., p.29.) He stated that his trial counsel “assured” him
“that everything had been fully explored,” including the medical advice defense.
(R., p.28.) He explained, “I was very reluctant and only agreed to change my plea
because I believed [trial counsel] had talked to my doctor, done a full investigation, and
that I had no other alternative than to abandon my defense.” (R., p.111.) Mr. Thomas
further stated:
Upon information and belief, [trial counsel] misled me to understand every
viable defense had been fully considered; that my only recourse was to
“plead guilty” or face a certain “life sentence[.]” Moreover, I am now to
understand such representations are categorically false; and, were I
aware of such facts I would not have abandoned my defenses nor agreed
to plead guilty.
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(R., p.29.) Thus, Mr. Thomas’s petitions and accompanying affidavits establish the
prejudice requirement. The evidence shows a reasonable probability that, but for trial
counsel’s errors, Mr. Thomas would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.
With regard to prejudice, the district court examined whether trial counsel would
have filed a motion to dismiss based on the defense and whether the motion would
prevail. (R., p.367.) Mr. Thomas contends this analysis was in error. Mr. Thomas did not
allege his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss; he argued his
counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty. “[W]here the alleged error of
counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the
crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether
the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
However, as the Court cautioned in McKeeth:
The impact of counsel’s errors on the defendant’s chances of success at
trial is a factor a court may use when determining the plausibility of the
defendant’s claim that those errors played a significant role in the decision
to plead guilty. In other words, the likelihood that without counsel’s errors
a defendant may or may not have been able to prevail at trial is relevant
only to the extent it sheds light on the defendant’s state of mind when he
pleaded guilty.
McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 852 (citations omitted). Here, Mr. Thomas established a prima
facie case of prejudice. Mr. Thomas’s guilty plea was not entered knowingly and
voluntarily because, when he pled guilty, he believed his trial counsel investigated,
considered, and then eliminated the medical advice defense. With regard to succeeding
at trial, an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve when, if at all, the defense
team contacted Dr. Roscoe and what information Dr. Roscoe provided to them. If, as
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Mr. Thomas asserted in his affidavit, Dr. Roscoe advised Mr. Thomas he was
noninfectious, Mr. Thomas would have had a defense to charges. Considering the
evidence presented by Mr. Thomas and reasonable inferences, the affirmative defense
of medical advice likely would have succeeded at trial. Therefore, Mr. Thomas showed
a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial with the affirmative defense of medical advice.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal
of his amended petition for post-conviction relief respect to the issue of whether trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the medical advice defense and remand
the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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